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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DISMISSED 
MR. PETT'S PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
POINT I 
THE APPELLEES5 "STATEMENT OF THE CASE" FALSELY REPRESENTS 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE TO THIS COURT. 
In their "Statement of Facts," the appellees falsely assert that: 
The petition for extraordinary relief arises out of the Petitioner's request to nullify 
Judge Marx's appointment as a temporary judge in Petitioner's criminal 
misdemeanor case. (Appellees' brief, page 12, f^ 2 ) 
That assertion is a deliberate false representation of the facts of this case. Judge Marx 
(hereinafter, "Marx") was not appointed to act as a tempo raiy justice court judge for Mr. 
Pett's case. At no time during the Box Elder County Conmiission hearing was Mr. Pett's 
name ever mentioned. At no time during the Commission meeting did either Mr. 
Hadfield or Judge Christensen (hereinafter, "Christensen") ever state, suggest or even 
imply that Marx was being appointed as justice court judge for Mr. Pett's case. See the 
Transcript of the December 8, 2008. The Box Elder County Commission attempted to 
appoint Marx as a "temporary justice court judge" for Box Elder County, without 
specifying that he was being appointed for any specific case, and specifically stating that 
his "appointment" was without any limit on the duration of the appointment. 
The appellees also falsely assert that Mr. Pert filed his Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief on December 1, 2009. (Appellees' brief, page 12, If 2.) The appellees then claim 
that Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief was dismissed on June 15, 2009, five and 
one half months before the appellees claim he filed it. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED 
THAT MARX WAS PROPERLY AND LAWFULLY APPOINTED AS A 
JUSTICE COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, WHEN THE BOX 
ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION FAILED TO APPOINT HIM IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF UCA §78A-2-202. 
A. The Box Elder County Commission Was Required To Comply With All Of The 
Requirements Set Forth In UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a)- And UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) 
When It Attempted To Appoint Marx As A Temporary Justice Court Judge. 
Contrary to the appellees' assertions, the Box Elder County Commission was 
required to comply with all of the requirements set forth in UCA §78A-7-202, when it 
attempted to appoint Marx as a temporaiy justice court judge, not just selected parts of it. 
In pertinent part, Rule 29(c)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that 
when a justice court judge is disqualified or recuses himself, the appointment of a 
replacement judge must be made in accordance with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202. 
Rule 29 URCriP states that assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138. UCA §78-5-138 was renumbered to UCA §78A-7-202 at the 
time of Marx's attempted appointment. Rule 29 URCrip, does not state, suggest or even 
imply, as the appellees would ask this Court to believe, that the appointment of a 
replacement or temporaiy justice court judge does not need to comply with all of the 
requirements mandated in UCA §78A-7-202 for the appointment of a temporary justice 
court judge. 
Likewise, UCA §78A-7-202 does not state, suggest or even imply, as the appellees 
would ask this Court to believe, that the appointment of a temporaiy justice court judge 
does not need to comply with all of the requirements specified in UCA §78A-7-202. 
Nowhere in UCA §78A-7-202 is there any indication whatsoever that its mandates only 
apply to "newly appointed judicial officer not holding judicial office, " rather than to all 
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appointments as a justice court judge, including temporary conflict appointments. 
The version of §78A-7-202(3)(a) in effect at the time of Marx's alleged 
appointment as a Box Elder County justice court judge stated: "After a newly appointed 
justice court judge has been confirmed, the local legislative body shall report the 
confirmed judge's name to the Judicial Council. " (Emphasis added). It does not state 
that the "legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the Judicial 
Council " only if the justice court judge is a "newly appointed judicial officer not holding 
judicial office, " as the appellees falsely assert. 
The version of UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) in effect at the time of Marx's alleged 
appointment as a Box Elder County justice court judge stated: 
The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications 
for office. (Emphasis added). 
It does not state that the Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office 
upon successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for 
office, only if the judge is a "newly appointed judicial officer not holding judicial office, " 
as the appellees falsely assert. 
The appellees claim that there is no "legitimate legislative purpose " in requiring 
the Box Elder County Commission to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-
202(3)(a) and UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b). As support for that assertion the appellees claim 
that: 
// is inferred, based on Judge Marx's standing as a current judge in the judicial 
district that he may exercise judicial authority upon appointment, absent 
presentment to the Judicial Council, because he already has core judicial 
functions and qualifies to perform judicial opinions on disqualification motions for 
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the county under Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
However, the appellees have not cited to, and cannot cite to, any provision of the Utah 
Code, any provision of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, any case law, or any 
legislative histoiy that states, suggests or even implies that an individual appointed as a 
temporary justice court judge is not subject to all of the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202. 
Likewise, the appellees have not cited to, and cannot cite to, any provision of the 
Utah Code, any provision of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, any case law, or any 
legislative histoiy that states, suggests or even implies they are permitted to ignore any 
provision of the Utah Code simply because they believe "// serves no legitimate 
legislative purpose, " or is (loverly burdensome and unnecessary. " 
The appellees do not have the right to ignore any provision of the Utah Code 
simply because they believe "// serves no legitimate legislative purpose, " or is lioverly 
burdensome and unnecessary. " If the appellees think that they are permitted to simply 
ignore the express provisions of UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a) and UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b), 
then they are required to challenge the validity of those sections of the Utah Code in 
court. But they are not entitled to simply ignore them because they believe they serve no 
legitimate purpose or because they are overly burdensome and unnecessary. 
The appellees have admitted that they did not comply with the provisions of either 
UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a) or UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) when they attempted to appoint Marx 
as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box Elder County. Therefore, because the appellees 
did not comply with the provisions of either §78A-7-202(3)(a) or UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) 
when they attempted to appoint Marx as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, his attempted appointment is invalid, as a matter of law, and nothing he has done 
either before or after his alleged appointment is valid, or can retroactively be made valid. 
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B. The Box Elder County Commission's Attempt To Appoint Mara To An Indefinite 
Term As A "Temporary Justice Court Judge" In Box Elder County Was Unlawful. 
Thus Making His Attempted Appointment Invalid As A Matter Of Law. 
In their brief, the appellees make the following statement: 
A temporary judge is appointed only to the limited context of the absence, or 
disqualification of the assigned judge. UCA §78A-7-208. The intent of the statute 
is to grant extended authority and subject matter jurisdiction for experienced 
judicial officers for the limited purpose of assisting with conflict cases. 
(Appellees' brief, page 18, \ 2). 
That assertion is not only simply the appellees' opinion, speculation, conjecture, and/or 
conclusion, it is also legally incorrect. 
A judge does not have subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter is conferred 
upon a court not a judge. Subject matter jurisdiction is based on the legal standing of the 
court to entertain a case and controversy. Salt Lake City, v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1994). It is not based on a particular judge's legal standing to entertain the case or 
controversy, as the appellees falsely claim. 
Additionally, there is nothing in UCA §78A-7-208 that states, suggests, or even 
implies that "The intent of the statute is to grant extended authority and subject matter 
jurisdiction for experienced judicial officers for the limited purpose of assisting with 
conflict cases, " as the appellees falsely claim. As previously established in this Brief, 
there is no mention of temporary justice court judges in UCA §78A-7-208, or any 
indication that temporary justice court judges are to be treated any differently under its 
provisions than is any other justice court judge. 
And again, the appellees have not cited, and cannot cite this Court to any provision 
of the Utah Code, any Rule of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or any case law that 
states, suggests, or even implies that "The intent of the statute is to grant extended 
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authority and subject matter jurisdiction for experienced judicial officers for the limited 
purpose of assisting with conflict cases, " as the appellees falsely claim. 
The appellees next make the false and ludicrous assertion that "In this case, Judge 
Marx was assigned Petitioner's misdemeanor case at the request of the Petitioner. " 
(Appellees' brief, page 18, ^ 3). The appellees then make another false statement to wit: 
"Petitioner filed a motion to recuse Judge Christensen and Judge Marx was appointed. " 
(Appellees' brief, page 18, ^  3), (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Pett never requested that Marx be assigned his case, as the appellees falsely 
claim, and there is nothing in the record indicating that Mr. Pett ever requested that Marx 
be assigned to his case, as the appellees falsely claim. Mr. Pett thought that Kevin 
Nelson, the justice court judge in Mantua, would be assigned the case, as he was in all 
cases before 2008. Additionally, Mr. Pett did not file a motion to "recuse Judge 
Christensen " as the appellees falsely claim. He filed a motion to disqualify Christensen, 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP. Furthermore, Marx was not specifically 
appointed to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case, as the appellees falsely claim. 
Christensen simply assigned the case to Marx to act as the justice court judge in Mr. 
Pett's case, in total disregard of both Rule 29, URCriP and UCA §78A-7-202. 
In the Box Elder County Commission hearing of December 8, 2008, when asked 
by Commissioner Van Dyke why they are asking the Commission to appoint Mark as a 
justice court judge in December 2008, if it has been a requirement to have him validly 
appointed since January of 2008, Christensen states: 
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word. But 
the - - the attorneys who have come in and the defendants who have come in have 
always just felt comfortable bringing in another judge. It's never really been 
thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and so many things every 
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day, I think it 'sjust something that was never really thought about before. 
(Page 9, lines 2-12). 
At the December 8, Box Elder County Commission Hearing Christensen also states: 
/ would hope that it - - more than anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable 
with I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - it doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I- -
/ - -1 know the other judges in the district felt really comfortable with him coming 
in. So it 'sjust - - it's purely from my side that I yve brought Judge Marx in. 
(Page 12, lines 4-14). 
At the December 8, Box Elder County Commission Hearing Christensen further stated, in 
response to Commissioner Davis' question about how many times the county has used 
Marx in the past, "Oh, maybe half a dozen times is all " (Page 6, lines 24-25). 
The appellees' assertion that: 
The county's appointment temporary appointment is therefore complete and 
whether Petitioner's misdemeanor case takes three to five years to reach a trial or 
sentence, the appointment of Judge Marx should remain so long as he maintains 
his office as a justice court judge within the judicial district, remains in good 
standing with the Judicial Council, and Box Elder County Commission approves 
of the appointment, (Appellee's brief, pages 18-19, fs 3-1), 
is nonsense. If Marx had in fact been appointed as a temporaiy justice court judge in Box 
Elder County specifically for Mr. Pett's case, then perhaps, the appellees would have a 
colorable claim that Marx's appointment as a temporaiy justice court judge for Mr. Pett's 
case did not need to specify a duration of the appointment, but his appointment would 
still not retro actively validate any of his decisions or rulings or other actions prior to his 
appointment. However, Marx was not appointed as a justice court judge specifically for 
Mr. Pett's case, as the appellees falsely claim. Marx was allegedly appointed as a 
"temporary justice court judge" for all past and future cases in Box Elder County and 
that alleged appointment was "indefinite, " as shown from the Transcript of the December 
8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission meeting. 
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Commissioner Davis: "So, Steve, as I understand it then the appointment would be 
to appoint David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then that 
appointment is indefinite? " 
Steven Hadfield: "That's right" 
Commissioner Davis: "That's right. " (Page 9, lines 18-23) 
Neither Mr. Pett nor his case is mentioned in the Commission meeting. It is, therefore, 
undisputable that Marx was appointed as a "temporary justice court judge " for all of his 
past and future cases in Box Elder County, not specifically for Mr. Pett's case, as the 
appellees are falsely asserting, and that alleged appointment of Marx was "indefinite. " 
In footnote 2 of the appellees' brief, the appellees make the following false 
assertion: 
Presumably, Judge Marx may retain his appointment as a temporary judge on 
Petitioner's case if he retires within the judicial district. However, if Judge Marx 
transfers or assumes another justice court judgeship outside of the judicial 
district, Judge Marx no longer qualifies as for a temporary judgeship appointment 
under UCA §78A-7-208. 
Again, Marx was never appointed as a temporary justice court judge specifically 
for Mr. Pett's case. Marx was allegedly appointed as a "temporary justice court judge" 
for all past and future cases in Box Elder County, not just Mr. Pett's case, and that 
alleged appointment was "indefinite. " If Marx had been lawfully appointed as a justice 
court judge specifically for Mr. Pett's case, then he would be permitted to remain as the 
justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case throughout the duration of the case. And contrary, 
to the appellees' assertion, Marx would be entitled to remain as the justice court judge in 
Mr. Pett's case even if he left the district, the state, or the countiy, unless his appointment 
was somehow rescinded. 
However, the appellees' assertion that Marx would no longer be authorized to act 
as the justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case, assuming he had been lawfully appointed as 
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a justice court judge for Mr. Pett's case if he leaves the district based on UCA §78A-7-
208 is false. UCA §78A-7-208 states: 
If a judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may appoint another 
justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial district to serve as a 
temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge may also be appointed 
as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the Supreme Court. 
There is nothing in UCA §78A-7-208 that states, suggests, or even implies that once a 
man or woman has been lawfully appointed as a justice court judge, the appointment 
becomes null and void if he or she no longer resides withiug the judicial district, as the 
appellees falsely claim. UCA §78A-7-208 only applies to the appointment of a justice 
court judge. It does not address how a justice court judge, once lawfully appointed, can 
be removed from his or her position as a justice court judge. 
The truth of the matter is that the appellees have no idea of how a justice court 
judge may be removed from office after he or she has been lawfully appointed, and that 
fact is evident from the appellees' false assertion that UCA §78A-7-208 states that a 
justice court judge may only hold office so long as he or she resides within the judicial 
district. 
Contrary to the assertions of the appellees, temporary justice court judges must be 
appointed for each case in which the regular justice court judge cannot act as the justice 
court judge. They cannot be appointed without duration, as the Box Elder County 
Commission attempted to do with Marx. Temporary justice court judges are appointed 
for each individual case to avoid the veiy problem that is the issue in this case. 
Because Marx was indisputably allegedly appointed as a "temporaryjustice court 
judge " for all of the past cases, in which he was involved, and future cases, in which he 
might be involved in Box Elder County, not just Mr. Pett's case, and because that alleged 
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appointment was "indefinite, " his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County is void as a matter of law, because it amounts to a lifetime appointment, in 
direct violation of UCA §20A-12-201(l)(a). 
As set forth in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, UCA §20A-12-201(l)(a) specifies: 
(1) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed retention 
election at the first general election held more than three years after the judge or 
justice was appointed. 
POINT III 
MARX MAY HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED TO ACT AS A JUSTICE COURT 
JUDGE WITHIN HIS JURISDICTION, I.E., HYDE PARK AND NORTH 
LOGAN, BUT HIS JURISDICTION WAS NOT BOX ELDER COUNTY, AND 
CHRISTENSEN COULD NOT APPOINT HIM AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE 
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY. 
In point 2 of their brief, the appellees falsely assert that the Utah Constitution, 
Article VIII, § 1, UCA §78A-M01, UCA §78A-2-202, and UCA §78A-2-201 provides: 
[Tjhat a temporary judge is qualified to perform core functions injustice courts, 
so long as they are a justice court judge within the judicial district or, or a retired 
judge appointed by the appointing authority. (Appellee's brief, page 20, \ 2). 
The appellees then, citing Ohms, supra, go on to state: i( Legislative authority, however, 
ldoes not extend to a legislative body the discretion to determine who has authority to 
exercise that jurisdiction. '" Then based on the referenced quote taken from Ohms, which 
is not relevant to any issue in this case, the appellees make following illogical and 
patently false statement: 
Thus, the local legislative body appointment process should not be extended to 
create discretion to appoint a temporary judge for each misdemeanor case where 
the judge is deemed absent or disqualified. (Appellees brief, page 21, f^ 1). 
Contrary to the appellees' assertion, a temporary justice court judge must be appointed 
for each case on which the regular justice court judge is unable to act as judge, or at the 
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veiy least a temporaiy justice court judge has to be appointed for a specified duration. As 
set forth in Mr. Pett's Opening Brief, temporaiy is not a synonym for indefinite. Black's 
Law Dictionaiy defines "temporary" as: 'That which is to last for a limited time only, as 
distinguished from that which is perpetual or indefinite, in its durations. " Thus, 
"temporaiy" is the opposite of "indefinite." 
The appointment of a man or woman as a "temporary justice court judge " for an 
"indefinite " period is an oxymoron. An individual cannot be both appointed as a 
"temporary justice court judge " and also have that appointment be "indefinite. " 
The appellees next assert, without any authority for their assertion, that justice 
courts have the authority to adopt procedures in harmony with the apparent intent of 
statutes or rules. While, justice courts may have some minor leeway to adopt minor 
procedures that do not contradict the provisions of the Utah Code or the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, they do not have any authority to ignore any provision of the Utah 
Code or the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to adopt any procedure that contradicts, 
amends, or supplants any provision of the Utah Code or the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
The appellees then admit that Marx was assigned Mr. Pett's case by Chiistensen 
before any attempt was made to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County. Mr. Pert filed his Petition for Extraordinary Relief on December 1, 2008, and 
Christensen acknowledged that Marx had no legal authority to act as a justice court judge 
in Mr. Pett's case by attempting to have Marx appointed a temporaiy judge at the first 
Box Elder Commissioners meeting on December 8, 2008 after Mr. Pert Petition filed his 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief on December 1, 2008. 
Although Marx may have been authorized to act as a justice court judge in Hyde 
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Park and North Logan at the time Chiistensen assigned him to act as a justice court judge 
in Mr. Pett's case, Marx was not authorized to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County. Before Marx could be assigned to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case, 
Marx first had to be lawfully appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. He 
could not be assigned to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case and then be 
appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County after he had been assigned by 
Chiistensen to act as a justice court judge, even assuming, arguendo, Chiistensen had any 
authority to assign Marx to act as a justice court judge, which he did not. Therefore, 
Marx was never authorized to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Pett's case before the 
Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint him as a justice court judge on 
December 8, 2008, and contrary to the appellees' assertion, there was no appointment to 
complete on December 8, 2008. (Appellees' brief page 21, ^  3). 
Although the appellees claim that Chiistensen received a call from the state 
"asking the courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed, " and that 
"the court administrator's office is concerned about it, " (Commission Hearing transcript, 
page 3, line 20-22), there is no evidence whatsoever that the Administrative Office of the 
Courts ever contacted Chiistensen, or that the Administrative Office of the Courts 
was "asking the courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed. " The 
puipose of the requirements of §78A-7-202(3)(a) is to insure that justice court judges are 
properly appointed. And if in fact the Administrative Office of the Court was "asking the 
courts to make sure that their judges are - -properly appointed, " it would do so in a 
letter, not in a phone call to Chiistensen. 
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POINT IV 
CONTRARY TO THE APPELLEES' ASSERTION, CHRISTENSEN 
UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED HIS JUDICIAL POWER TO MARX. 
The appellees falsely claim that Christensen was lawfully entitled to assign his 
judicial duties to Marx. The appellees falsely claim that because Marx was a justice 
court judge in Hyde Park and North Logan, he was a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, even though they also admit that "[T]he appointment process was required to 
complete the assignment of conflict cases..,. " (Appellees' brief page, 22, ^s 1 and 2). 
The Appellees also falsely claim that this case is distinguishable from Holm v. 
Smilowitz. 840 P.2d 147 (Ut. App. 1992), because the appointment of a commissioner is 
dissimilar to one justice court judge assigning another justice court judge cases even 
though he or she has not been appointed to act as a justice court judge in the court or in 
the county. In so doing, the appellees deliberately misstate the facts and the ruling in 
Smilowitz. 
In Smilowitz, the commissioner was in fact lawfully appointed as a commissioner 
in the court, unlike Marx who was not lawfully appointed as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County. Smilowitz did not, as the appellees falsely claim, deal with the 
appointment of the commissioner. The ruling in Smilowitz was that a judge could not 
assign his judicial duties to a person who was not a judge. Smilowitz is directly on point 
with this case because just as the judge in Smilowitz could not assign his judicial duties 
to a person who was not a judge, Christensen could not assign his judicial duties to Marx 
who was not a justice court judge in Box Elder County, irrespective of whether or not he 
was a justice court judge in Hyde Park and North Logan. 
A justice court judge only has authority within his or her jurisdiction. UCA §78A-
7-104(1). Because Marx had no judicial authority outside of Hyde Park or North Logan, 
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he was a not a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and Christensen could not 
delegate his judicial authority to Marx. Because Christensen unlawfully delegated his 
judicial authority to Marx, nothing Marx did, while acting as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County is valid. 
POINT V 
THE ATTEMPTED APPOINTMENT OF MARX AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE 
DID NOT, AND AS A MATTER OF LAW, CANNOT VALIDATE ANY OF 
MARX'S RULINGS, DECISIONS OR OTHER ACTIONS, THAT OCCURRED 
PRIOR TO HIS ATTEMPTED APPOINTMENT AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE 
IN BOX ELDER COUNTY. 
The appellees next falsely claim that Kasteler v. Gibbons 080207 UTCA, holds 
that an assignment of a case by one justice court judge to another justice court judge can 
be retroactively validated. That assertion is another deliberate misrepresentation of the 
facts and the holding of Kasteler . 
In making their false claim that Kasteler holds that an assignment of a case by one 
justice court judge to another justice court judge can be retroactively validated, the 
appellees also falsely state the facts of Kasteler. The appellees falsely claim: 
The facts of Kasteler state that the entire case was first transferred to a 
neighboring jurisdiction (the Holladay Justice Court) and a substitute judge 
(Judge Daniel Gibbons), rather than keeping the case within the jurisdiction, 
(Appellees' brief, page 23, ^ 1). 
That assertion is a deliberate false representation to this Court. Mr. Kastler's cases were 
not transferred to the Holladay Justice Court. Judge Johnson simply assigned Judge 
Gibbons to act as the justice court judge in Mr. Kastler's cases. Mr. Kastler's cases did 
not become Holladay Justice Court cases because Judge Johnson assigned Judge Gibbons 
to act as a justice court judge in Mr. Kastler's cases. 
Judge Linberg did not order Mr. Kastler's cases transferred back to the South Salt 
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Lake Justice Court. She ordered the Mayor of South Salt Lake to appoint a justice court 
judge to hear Mr. Kastler's cases, because Judge Johnson had no authority to appoint 
Gibbons as a justice court judge. 
The appellees also falsely represent the relevant ruling from Kasteler . Judge 
Lindberg vacated the appointment of Judge Gibbons because Judge Johnson had no 
authority to appoint Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake, and Judge 
Lindberg directed the South Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a substitute justice court judge to 
hear Kasteler's cases. Judge Lindberg specifically cited to UCA 78-5-138, in vacating 
the appointment of Gibbons, and when instructing the Salt Lake Mayor to appoint a 
substitute justice court judge to hear Mr. Kasteler's cases. Just as Judge Johnson was not 
empowered to appoint Judge Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake, 
Christensen was not empowered to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County. Just as the Mayor of South Salt Lake was required to comply with the provisions 
of UCA 78-5-138, when appointing a temporaiy justice court judge to hear Mr. Kasteler's 
cases, the Box Elder County Commission was required to comply with the provisions of 
UCA §78A-7-202 in order to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County 
before Marx could act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, in Mr. Pett's case or 
any other cases. 
POINT VI 
MR. PETT CANNOT CITE TO THE RECORD OF A COURT THAT IS NOT A 
COURT OF RECORD, WHICH WILL NOT PERMIT HIM TO EVEN LOOK AT 
HIS FILE. 
The appellees assert that Mr. Pett's claims should be denied because he has not 
cited to the record to show what rulings Marx made, what decisions he made, what 
judgments he entered, what sentences he imposed, what fines he imposed or what other 
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actions he may have taken before the Box Elder County Commission attempted to 
appoint him as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. The appellees are demanding 
that Mr. Pett cite to the record of a court that is not a court of record. 
Justice courts are not courts of record, UCA §78A-7-101. Therefore, it is 
impossible for Mr. Pett to cite to the nonexistent records. Furthennore, even if the justice 
courts were courts of record, the Box Elder County justice court is the only court in the 
state in which Mr. Pett's counsel cannot review the court's file. Neither Mr. Pett nor any 
of his attorneys are permitted to see Mr. Pett's court file. If Mr. Pett or his attomeys want 
something from the court's file, they have to tell the clerks what it is they want from the 
file, and the clerks will then decide if they can have it. But under no circumstance is 
either Mr. Pett or his attorneys ever entitled to review the court's file to see what is in it. 
Because the Box Elder justice court is not a court of record, and because neither 
Mr. Pett nor his attorneys are permitted to even see the court's file on Mr. Pett, it is 
impossible for Mr. Pett to cite to the record of the justice court. Because it is impossible 
for Mr. Pett to cite to the record of the justice court, that is not a court of record, this 
Court cannot logically or lawfully require him to cite to nonexistent records. 
POINT VII 
MARX WAS NOT A DE FACTO JUDGE PRIOR TO THE ATTEMPT BY THE 
BOX ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION TO APPOINT HIM AS A JUSTICE 
COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY. 
The appellees have waived any right they may have had to claim that Marx was a 
de facto judge, because they failed to raise that claim in the trial court. The Supreme 
Court, as well as this Court, has repeatedly and consistently held that a claim that was not 
raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
In State ex rel. D.B. v. State. 2010 UT App 111, 20080837-CA (UTCA) 2010 UT 
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App 111, this Court, citing Main St. v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) stated: 
To preserve an issue for appeal the issue must have been presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on that issue. See 438 
Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^51, 99 P.3d 801. "Thispreservation 
rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a [party] can demonstrate 
that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred." hunt v. Lance, 2008 
UT App 192, Tj 23, 186 P.3d 978 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Issues that are not raised at trial are generally deemed to be waived. See 
438 Main St., 2004 UT 72, \ 51. 
Because the appellees did not claim in the trial court that Mara was a defacto judge, they 
are precluded from doing so for the first time on this appeal. Therefore, the appellees' 
assertion that Mara was any sort of de facto judge must be summarily dismissed. 
However, assuming, arguendo, that the appellees were entitled to assert for the 
first time on Appeal that Mara was a de facto judge in Bo* Elder County prior to the time 
the Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint him as a justice court judge in 
Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, the facts of the case and the relevant law proves 
that Mara was not a de facto judge in Box Elder County, as the appellees falsely claim. 
The appellees improperly cite to Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 853 (Utah 
1990) as authority for their spurious and disingenuous conclusion that Mara actions prior 
to his attempted appointment by the Box Elder County Commission as a justice court 
judge are valid because he was a "defacto judge." In so doing the appellees misstate 
both the facts of Ohms, the holding of Ohms, and the facts of this case. 
The appellees correctly state that the Ohms court stated: 
A judge defacto is defined as: 
One who holds and exercises the office of a judge under color of lawful authority 
and by a title valid on its face, though he has not full right to the office, as where 
he was appointed under an unconstitutional statute, or by an usurper of the 
appointing power, or has not taken the oath of office. 
However, the definition of a de facto judge set forth in Ohms does not support the 
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appellees' assertion that, under the facts of this case, Marx can be considered a de facto 
judge with respect to any of his actions, in any cases, in which he was involved prior to 
the Box Elder County Commission's attempt to appoint him as a justice court judge in 
Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. 
It is indisputable that Marx was not appointed under an unconstitutional statute. It 
is also undisputable that Marx was not appointed by anyone who usurped any appointing 
power. There was never any attempt to "appoint" Marx as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County, prior to the December 8, 2008, attempt by the Box Elder County 
Commission to appoint him. Marx was simply assigned cases by Christensen in total 
disregard of the appointment process mandated in UCA §78A-7-202. And he was simply 
assigned cases by Christensen because Christensen believes that he can do whatever he 
wants in the Box Elder County justice court, and the laws do not apply to him. 
/ would hope that it - - more than anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable 
with. I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - // doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I - -
I - -... So it 'sjust —it's purely from my side that I've brought Judge Marx in. 
(County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 12, line 4-14). 
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word.... 
It's never really been thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and 
so many things every day, I think it's just something that was never really thought 
about before. (County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 2-12). 
Clearly Christensen's own statements prove there was never any attempt to 
appoint Marx as a justice court judge because Christensen never thought there was any 
need to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202. Christensen does not claim that 
he was unaware of the requirements of UCA §78A-7-202, that mandate how a justice 
court judge must be appointed. He simply states that he didn't really care about the 
requirements of UCA §78A-7-202, and never really thought about them because he has to 
deal with so many codes and things eveiy day. 
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Christensen is a justice court judge and an attorney. He was appointed as a justice 
court judge, and, therefore, cannot claim he was unaware of the procedure and process 
required to appoint justice court judges. 
Christensen does not claim that he ever attempted to appoint Marx as a justice 
court judge in Box Elder County. Christensen states that he had Marx come in because 
he thinks he, rather the appointing authority under UCA §78A-7-202, is entitled to decide 
who should be a justice court judge in Box Elder County if he is disqualified. 
I would hope that it - - more than anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable 
with. I mean, I don 7 know that it's - - it doesn 7 say that it's my decision, but I --
I - -... So it 'sjust - - it's purely from my side that I 've brought Judge Marx in. 
(County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 12, line 4-14). 
Marx was apparently appointed as a justice court judge, and although he does not 
claim to be an attorney, he does claim to have a jurist doctorate, from Concord Online 
Law School. Given the fact that Marx was apparently appointed to be a justice court 
judge, he also cannot claim he did not know the procedure and process for the 
appointment of a justice court judge. Therefore, he cannot claim that he did not know 
that he had to be appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County before he was 
entitled to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. 
Both Christensen and Marx simply chose to ignore the provisions of Rule 29 
URCriP and UCA §78A-7-202, that specify how a justice court judge must be appointed 
when a justice court judge is disqualified, recuses himself or herself, or is unable to act as 
a justice court judge. They did so because they simply do not believe that they are 
required to comply with either the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP or UCA §78A-7-202. 
/ think its just been done and nobody has taken - - care is not the right word.... 
It rs never really been thought about. You know, we deal with so many codes and 
so many things every day, I think it 'sjust something that was never really thought 
about before. (County Commission Hearing Transcript, page 9, lines 2-12). 
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Because no one ever usurped any appointment power of the appointing authority 
under the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202, and because, admittedly, there was never any 
attempt to usurp any appointment power of the appointing authority under the provisions 
of UCA §78A-7-202, the appellees assertion that Marx was a de facto justice court judge 
prior to the Box Elder County Commissions attempt to appoint him as a justice court 
judge on December 8, 2008, is factually incorrect, and is incorrect as a matter of law. 
Because neither Rule 29, URCriP nor UCA §78A-7-202 require that a justice court 
judge appointed to act as a judge in a jurisdiction where the regular justice court judge 
has been disqualified, recused himself or herself, or is unable to act as justice court judge 
take an oath of office, that portion of the Ohms stating that a de facto may be one who 
has been properly appointed but has not taken the oath of office, is irrelevant, and cannot 
be said to qualify Marx as a de facto justice court judge. 
The appellees next claim that Marx should be considered a de facto "officer" 
under the holding of Vance v. Fordham, 671 P.2d 124 (Utah 1983). The appellees claim 
that Marx should be considered a de facto officer because, they assert: 
[H]e was transferred Petitioner's case pursuant to Rule 29 while he held a judicial 
office within the district. The assignment of the Petitioner's case, in accordance 
with Rule 29, constitutes a circumstance of reputation or acquiescence calculated 
to induce the parties, without any inquiry to submit to his position as a judicial 
officer. 
That assertion is another false representation of the facts on the part of the appellees and 
yet another misrepresentation of the applicable law. 
As this Court made clear in Kasteler, supra, and as mandated by Judge Lindberg, 
under the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP, and UCA 78-5-138, the Mayor of South Salt 
Lake had to first appoint a substitute justice court judge to hear Kasteler's cases, and then 
Kasteler's cases could be assigned to a justice court judge who was lawfully appointed, 
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as required by UCA 78-5-138. The Mayor of South Salt Lake could not, after the fact, 
appoint Judge Gibbons, who had already been assigned by Judge Johnson to hear 
Kasteler's cases, as a justice court judge to hear his cases, otherwise, Judge Lindberg 
would not have vacated Judge Gibbons assignment as the justice court judge in Kasteler's 
cases. She would have simply told the Mayor of South Salt Lake to ratify Judge's 
appointment of Judge Gibbons as the justice court judge in Kasteler's cases by appointing 
him a justice court judge in South Salt Lake. Therefore, under the law as established in 
Kasteler. Marx was not lawfully transferred Mr. Pett's case pursuant to either Rule 29 
URCriP or UCA §78A-7-202. 
Contrary to the appellees' assertion, Christensen's unlawful assignment of cases to 
Marx was not in accordance with the provisions of Rule 29 URCriP, and they were not a 
"circumstance of reputation or acquiescence to induce the parties, without any inquiry, 
'to submit to his position as a judicial officer. " No defendant who ever appeared before 
Marx was "induced" into submitting to his alleged position as a judicial officer. All 
defendants, including Mr. Pert were forced into going into court with Marx acting as a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County. They did not acquiesce in Marx acting as a 
justice court judge. They had no choice as to whether or not to submit to his unlawful 
presence in the Box Elder justice court. 
The appellees cannot seriously claim that defendants, especially defendants in the 
"justice court system," are sophisticated enough to have any idea that the person wearing 
the black robe may not be a lawful justice court judge, and that they have the right to 
question the person's authority to act as a justice court judge. Therefore, no defendant 
who appeared before Marx could knowingly and voluntarily acquiesce to Marx acting as 
a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and without acquiescence on the part of the 
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defendants, even under the appellees' false representations of the facts, Marx cannot be 
deemed to have acted as a de facto justice court judge. 
Marx's knowing and willful violation of the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202, 
cannot be construed to promote the interests of justice for either the public or the 
unwitting defendants who were forced to appear before him and were subjected to his 
unlawful acts. The holdings of Olms and Fordham. supra, require that in order for a 
person to be considered a "defact officer, " the interests of public policy and justice must 
be advanced, as well as the interests of the people affected. No one can seriously claim 
that pemiitting judges to flout the law promotes the interests of public policy and justice 
or benefits defendants who are unaware they are being forced to appear before someone 
who is not a lawfully appointed judge. Therefore, under the holdings of Olms and 
Fordham. Marx cannot be considered to be a de facto justice court judge, prior to his 
attempted appointment. 
However, even if Marx could be considered to be a de facto justice court judge in 
the other cases in which he unlawfully acted as a justice court judge, he cannot be 
deemed to be a defacto justice court judge in this case. Mr. Pert objected to Marx's 
authority to act as a justice court judge in his case as soon as Marx was appointed. 
Therefore, just as commissioner Peuler could not be considered a de facto justice court 
judge in Mr. Olms case, Marx cannot be deemed to be a de facto judge in this case. 
POINT VIII 
THE APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED ANY RIGHT THEY MAY HAVE HAD TO CLAIM 
MR. PETT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO FILE HIS PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF. 
Even assuming, auguendo, that Mr. Pert did not have standing to file his Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief, the appellees have waived that issue by failing to raise it in the 
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trial court. See State ex rel. D.B. v. State, and Main St. v. Easy Heat. Inc.. supra. The 
appellees have not cited, and cannot cite, this to the record of this case where they 
asserted Mr. Pett does not have standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
They have not done so because they cannot do so, because they never made any such 
assertion in the trial court. Therefore, they have waived that claim and cannot raise it for 
the first time on appeal. 
In State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880. 886 (Utah App. 1990). citing State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), this Court stated that standing is not a 
jurisdictional doctrine but rather a substantive doctrine, that is waived if it is not asserted 
in the trial court. This Court then went on to state, again citing Schlosser. supra, that 
standing is a claim of error cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and that standing 
had been waived in Schlosser because it had not been raised in the trial court. 
Because it is indisputable, that the appellees did not raise the issue of Mr. Pett's 
standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the trial court, they are now 
precluded from raising it for the first time on appeal. 
However, even assuming, arguendo, that the appellees are entitled to assert that 
Mr. Pett lacked standing to file his petition for Extraordinary Relief, Mr. Pett indisputably 
has standing to do so. 
As soon as Marx appeared in court claiming to be the justice court judge in Mr. 
Pett's case Mr. Pett challenged Marx's authority to act as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County. Mr. Pett even filed a Motion to Disqualify Marx because he was not 
qualified to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. Marx simply ignored the 
Motion. 
Marx also entered a ruling disqualifying Mr. Pett's attorney from representing him. 
Marx denied Mr. Pett's Request for a Bill of Particulars. Marx denied Mr. Pett's Motion 
to Compel Discovery from both the Brigham City Prosecutor and the Brigham City 
Police Department. Marx denied Mr. Pett's Motion to Disqualify Michael Christiansen 
from prosecuting him based on Christiansen's conflict of interest in acting as the 
prosecutor while at the same time the law firm for which he works represents the 
witnesses, and complainants in Mr. Pett's case. All of these mlings were made before the 
Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint Marx as a justice court judge on 
December 8, 2008. Therefore, Mr. Pett clearly has suffered distinct and palpable injuries 
that give him standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The attempted appointment of Marx as a justice court judge was unlawful because 
the Box Elder County Commission failed to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-
202(3 )(a), requiring the Commission to report his name to the Judicial Council, because 
the Box Elder County Attorney had not written a letter to the Judicial Council stating that 
in his opinion, Marx meets the statutory qualifications for the office of a justice court 
judge in Box Elder county, as mandated by UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b), because the Judicial 
Council had not certified Marx to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, as 
mandated by UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b), and because Christensen could not delegate his 
judicial authority to Marx. The attempted appointment of Marx as a justice court judge 
was also unlawful because Marx was appointed as a temporary justice court judge with 
an indefinite term, in violation of Utah law. 
Marx was not a de facto justice court judge prior to his attempted appointment, 
and the appellees have waived any right they may have had to claim he was when they 
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failed to make that assertion in the trial court. 
Mr. Pert had standing to file his Petition for Extraordinary Relief because he has 
clearly suffered distinct and palpable injuries as a result of Marx's unlawful actions. 
Because Marx's attempted appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County was unlawful, and because Marx camiot be considered as a de facto justice court 
judge, for any case, this Court must reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this 
case back to the trial court with instructions to enter an order declaring that Marx was not 
lawfully appointed as a justice court judge by the Box Elder County Commission on 
December 8, 2008, that the Box Elder County Commission could not retroactively 
validate ChristenseiTs appointment of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, 
and that the Box Elder County Commission could not retroactively validate any of 
Marx's rulings made, orders entered, judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties 
assessed, jail time imposed, or any other purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, 
while purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of 
his attempted appointment as a justice court judge in Box Eder County on December 8, 
2008. 
Respectfully submitted th i s^_aay of June 2010. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Robert Pert 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
COMMISSIONER HARDING Lee's go ahead Tell 
us about the appointment of David Marx as a justice 
court judge. 
STEVEN HADFIELD It's my -- it's my 
understanding that tne Justice Court occasionally has a 
need to have another judge come and fill in, whether 
there's a conflict, whether the judge is out of town, 
whatever the circumstance may be. 
I think what we're here to do today is just 
to have that appointment made so that that judge can 
The statute says that the appointing 
authority is the Chairman of the County Commission, 
that should be you. 
Once the appointment's made, a majority of 
the legislative body, which would be three of you, 
confirms the appointment And so I think that's what 
we're here for. 
Is that right9 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN Yeah We're -- m fact, 
a temporary justice court judge as opposed to pro tern. 
Yeah There's -- there's two ways to bring m a --
another judge One is througn the Supreme Court, and 


























chat's the pro tern process. 
The ocher way is just to appoint a temporary 
justice courc judge. Temporary justice -- doesn't give 
any kind of a cime frame just to back up mostly for 
cases where I have to recuse myself. 
It's not being different from what we've been 
doing in the past as far as somebody coming in and 
start doing my work for me or anything like that. It's 
just that we wanted to make him official per the code 
is all. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Well, now, look, we 
have appointed replacements in the past. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: We had -- years ago, we 
had Judge Nelson sworn in. I think he was called pro 
tern. That's what the courts were doing then. I'm not 
sure if that was really per the code, but that's what 
we had done. 
I -- I got a phone call last week that the 
state is actually asking the courts to make sure that 
their judges are -- are properly appointed. And so 
this comes from the state level to -- the court 
administrator's office is concerned about it. 
all. 
So we just wanted to make it per the code is 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So, Steven, was there a 
HIGH DESERT REPORTING /^ T r \ r n / - /•» 
1 I change in the code or just this is brought to our 
2 I awareness, and we need to take action on it? 
3 UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE: (Inaudible.) 
4 STEVEN HADFIELD: There was a change, but 
5 I -- I think it was the same before the change. If you 
6 look at the code today, there's a section that's 
7 effective from the first of this year until the end, 
8 and then it changes again next year. 
9 So there was a change the first of the year, 
10 but I think it was -- and I haven't researched it out, 
11 but I think it was probably the same requirement. 
12 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: What's the appointing 
13 period? Do you appoint on a calendar year or do you 
14 appoint and then they're appointed until they're 
15 released? 
16 STEVEN HADFIELD: It just says -- and there's 
17 really no -- it's says temporary, and there's really no 
18 definition of temporary. 
19 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I — I think probably 
20 until they're released because the pro tern process that 
21 comes down from the Supreme Court, that makes it clear 
22 that it's on a per case basis just for that case. And 
23 they have to be sworn in as a pro tern on each 
24 individual case as opposed to this. 
25 And so where they don't say per case, then I 
think chat we're good jusn until it runs out or until 
2 | we decide otherwise. 
3 | STEVEN KADFIELD: I would agree with that. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Would we appoint more 
5 I than one temporary --
6 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: If -- if you're going to 
7 be using --
8 COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- justice court 
9 judge? 
10 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: If you're going to be 
11 using three or four throughout, you know, depending on 
12 the circumstances, you'd probably want to appoint more 
13 than one. 
14 All right. I think Peggy and I can talk 
15 about that. We'll look at that maybe down the road. I 
16 don't know that we need to do that today. 
17 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And it's usually -- it's 
18 just if you have a conflict or if you have an overload 
19 or - -
20 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I -- P v e never had a 
21 judge come in and do work for me when I've been out of 
22 town. So it would just be when I -- when I've got a 
23 conflict, not an overload, just to come in for a couple 
24 of hours to help me out in a case where I've had to 
25 recuse myself. 





















































COMMISSIONER HARDING: My question is 
obviously require -- requirements is -- he's, I assume, 
a certified judge? 
KEVIN CHRISTENSSN: Yes. He's currently --
the -- che court requires that we bring in a judge who 
is currently a judge within the First Judicial 
District, which is Box Elder, Cache or Rich Counties. 
Judge Marx is at Hyde Park over in Cache 
County; so he qualifies under the code uo come in. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: And so the 
qualifications of -- of using him or anybody that they 
have to be in the First --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: They have to be in the 
First District, and they have to be a sitting judge. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: or -- or 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: They can be a retired 
judge, I think it says. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- or -- but they have 
to have the certification? 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Exactly. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Yes. 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: And that's changed. 
The boundaries have changed. It used to be your 
jurisdiction. Right? 


























KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Well, no. Because, I 
mean, I've -- I've nad Judge Russell come over, and 
I've gone over to Logan. So my jurisdiction has been 
Box Elder County. I think it's always said First 
District _'d have to look. 
STEVEN HADFIELD: The -- the state if 
you're -- the state divides the -- if the state's 
divided into judicial districts for the First, Weber 
County is the Second, and then you've got the Third; 
that would be Salt Lake. And so it talks about 
judicial districts. 
So the statute refers to a judge from our 
judicial district. So it'd be anywhere within that 
district, and I think that's probably been the case all 
along. I'm not sure about that, but I think so. It is 
the case now. 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: This is -- this is 
only a question. If this -- if this has been a 
requirement by ordinance or by statutes, we're -- we're 
in the 11th month of the year. It's been in place 
since January. 
I'm curious as to why it's coming now --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Well --
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: - - a s opposed to 
'anuary? 
W7P,W npqTTPT R E P O R T I N G ( 4 3 5 ) 5 8 6 - 0 8 3 0 C) 
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1 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Ii's -- well, I think 
2 it's probably been in place before January. I think it 
3 has just been done and nobody has taken -- care is not 
4 the right word. 
5 But the -- the attorneys who have come in and 
6 the defendants who have come in have always just felt 
7 comfortable bringing in another judge. 
8 It's never been questioned. It's never 
9 really been thought about. You know, we deal with so 
10 many codes and so many things every day, I think it's 
11 just something that has just never really been thought 
12 about before. 
13 It had been brought to our attention like 
14 this after the state or administrator's office -- it's 
15 been brought to our attention through a pending case. 
16 And so we jusc want to make sure that it's -- it's done 
17 right. 
18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So, Steve, as I 
19 understand it then, the appointment would be to appoint 
20 David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then 
21 that appointment is indefinite? 
22 STEVEN HADFISLD: That's right. 
23 j COMMISSIONER DAVIS: That's right. 
24 | STEVEN HADF1ELD: Yes. And the appointment 
25 is made by the chairman, and then that appointment 
HIGH DESRPT p^DfiDT-wp 
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be -- would be confirmed by a vo:e of the commission. 
2 I COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So we take a motion on 
3 f thai or do we have further -- or does che chairman make 
a recommendation to us that --
5 j KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: The chairman would 
6 I appoint -- on the record, appoint the judge as the 
7 judge, and then there would be a confirming vote taken. 
8 LUANN ADAMS: How do we do that? 
9 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yeah. How do we do 
10 that? 
11 COMMISSIONER HARDING: It sounds different, 
12 what we're 
13 LUANN ADAMS: We need a notification of that. 
14 COMMISSIONER HARDING: Should I ask for a 
15 vote now and --
16 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I think you could. 
17 COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- and then -- and 
18 then go ahead and affirm and appoint and sign? 
19 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, I think what we 
20 could do is we could make a motion to approve the 
21 chair's recommendation. 
22 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I believe that would 
2 3 work. 
24 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. I -- I make a 
25 motion chac we approve --
1 I COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: Before we gee to 
2 I uhaz, I have a question. 
3 | Are there other -- other potential appointees 
on the list? Hopefully, one thac's not as far away as 
5 | Cache Valley. 
6 I KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Hyde Park. Yeah. We --
7 Judge Nelson from Mantua has come in and helped before. 
8 Judge Marx is law trained, and so I feel more 
9 comfortable bringing him in on a lot of the cases. 
10 Some of the cases where I have to recuse 
11 myself are sometimes more complicated than others. And 
12 I've just felt real comfortable having him come in to 
13 do the cases. I think he does a good job. 
14 So, I mean, if, sometime down the road, you 
15 wanted to look at different people, I guess that would 
16 be a possibility too. 
17 STEVEN HADFIELD: Commissioner Van Dyke, are 
18 you asking shall we ask for competing proposals or a 
19 bid contracting for professional services? 
20 There's not that requirement. So, you know, 
21 based upon the judge's experience or the county 
22 attorney's experience, oftentimes we'll contract for 
23 professional services. 
24 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. I -- I don't know 
25 that it would be applicable in a case like this. 

























COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: Obviously, ic's not a 
requiremenc. I see it is a . 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I don't know what 
proposal they would ever make. I mean, I don't -- I --
I don't think it's a -- a money issue. 
So I don't think they'd be saying I can do it 
for this much. I would hope that it -- more than 
anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable with. 
I mean, I don't know that it's -- it doesn't 
say that it's my decision, but I -- I -- I know the 
other judges in the other district just felt real 
comfortable with him coming in. So it's just -- it's 
purely just from my side that I've brought Judge Marx 
in . 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Okay. I think we got 
this right. I'm gonna' try. With what you've told me, 
I would like to make a recommendation that we appoint 
David Marx as a temporary justice or judge. 
Now I would like to have a motion --
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I'll -- I'll make the 
motion to approve the recommendation from the chair of 
the appointment of David Marx as temporary justice 
court judge for Box Elder Councy. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: I have a motion. Do I 
have a second? 
' « i c l r o r n o -> n ) *~\ 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: And I've struggled 
with this (inaudible) at the 11th hour. It's very --
well, that's enough. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: I'll second the 
motion. All in favor say aye. 
(Ayes voiced.) 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: The motion carries. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Did you vote for him 
then? 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: No, I didn't. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: He voted to --
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You didn't mean to, did 
you? Three should be enough. 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: So that would be a 
nay. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Nay. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Okay. Okay. Motion 
carries. Thank you. 



























COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
BE IT KNOWN chat the foregoing audio 
recorded proceedings were transcribed by me, CAROLE 
YELTON, a Notary Public in the County of Washington, 
for the State of Utah, from a CD audio recording 
received directly from the Box Elder County Recorder's 
Office; that the foregoing 12 pages are a true and 
correct transcript of said proceedings, all done to the 
best of my skill and ability. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am in no way 
related to any of the parties hereto; nor am I in any 
way interested in the outcome hereof. 
DATED at New Harmony, Utah, this 5th day 
of January, 2010. 
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Notadf Public 
My commission expires 
February 27, 2011 
N'.tarv i^ noiic 
:AP3LE ,'ELT' W 
>ir - V i ,4 • 
'Ifl '.,£11.,,' ; , E i . " 
~Ji ' . i l l 'J~ C, 
HTPH DESERT REPORTING (435)586-0830 ; 
20A-12-201. Judicial appointees - Retention elections. 
(1) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed 
retention election at the first general election held more than three years after 
the judge or justice was appointed. 
UCA §78A-2-202 
Vacancy. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Appointing authority" means: 
(i) for a county: 
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county operating under the county 
commission or expanded county commission form of county government; 
(B) the county executive in a county operating under the county executive-council 
form of county government; and 
(C) the county manager in a county operating under the council-manager form of 
county government; and 
(ii) for a city or town, the mayor of the city or town. 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council; and 
(ii) for a city or town, the council of the city or town. 
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and 
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body. 
(3) (a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed, the local 
legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the Judicial Council 
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications 
for office. 
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the 
Judicial Council 
78-5-138. Temporary justice court judge. 
if a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may 
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial 
district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge 
may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the 
Supreme Court. 
78A-7-101. Creation of justice court — Not of record. 
Under Article VIII, Section 1, Utah Constitution, there is created a court not of 
record known as the justice court. The judges of this court are justice court judges. 
IB 
78A-7-104. Justice court judge authority. 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as 
judges of courts of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of 
probable cause; and 
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction; and 
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own recognizance. 
I 
78A-7-208. Temporary justice court judge. 
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority 
may appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the 
judicial district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice 
court judge may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under 
rule of the Supreme Court. 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom 
a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that 
court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, 
unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, but if the 
assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substtute judge can 
proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom 
a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the 
court after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge 
assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council maty perform those 
duties. 
(c)( 1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the 
motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating 
facts sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not 
later than 20 days after the last of the following: 
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise 
of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the 
motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall 
be filed as soon as practicable. 
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 
11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the 
procedures and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion 
to disqualify in an action. 
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, 
without further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the 
motion and affidavit to a reviewing judge. The judge shall lake no further 
action in the case until the motion is decided. If the judge grants the motion, 
the order shall direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no 
presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign 
another judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases shall 
be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138. The presiding judge of the 
court, any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely 
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall 
assign another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment injustice 
court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-5-138. 
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may 
consider any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge 
who is the subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to 
questions posed by the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely 
manner. 
(d)(1) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a 
fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is 
pending, either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, 
ask to have the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(d)(2) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are 
true and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the 
removal of the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the 
objection and all records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith 
to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied lhat the 
representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either 
enter an order denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to 
resolve the matter and receive further evidence with resped to the alleged 
prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of 
record concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge 
who shall hear the case. 
